



Abstract—This paper provides an overview of auction theory 
literature. We present a general review on literature of various 
auctions and focus ourselves specifically on an English auction. We 
are interested in modelling bidder’s behavior in an English auction 
environment. And hence, we present an overview of the New Zealand 
wool auction followed by a model that would describe a bidder’s 
decision making behavior from the New Zealand wool auction. The 
mathematical assumptions in an English auction environment are 
demonstrated from the perspective of the New Zealand wool auction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
HIS paper aims to present an overview of auction theory 
literature. We begin with a brief history of the auction 
followed by the types of auctions practiced nowadays. In the 
second section, we present the review of literature on auction 
theory highlighting the English auction environment. The third 
section deals with a brief introduction of the New Zealand wool 
auction and its relation to the New Zealand Wool Industry 
(NZWI). In the fourth section, the mathematical assumptions in 
an English auction environment are demonstrated taking into 
account the New Zealand wool auction. Further, an illustration 
of a bidder’s decision making behavior in the New Zealand 
wool auction is presented in a model. Finally, we summarize 
the paper and propose future work. 
Literally, the word auction is derived from ‘augere’ meaning 
“to increase”. When we go to the history of auction we can see 
the practice was started in Babylon from 500 BC [1]. In the 
modern world, auctions are used primarily for transactions of 
goods and services. Auctions help in a way to form the price 
and make a contribution of empirical significance on the 
exchange of ownership of goods. The study of auction is 
interesting to the traders because the value of the item is 
uncertain in an auction. Further, the parties involved (buyer and 
seller) do not know the exact information of the item. However, 
among the two parties one is much more familiar with the 
relevant information of the item than the other. The buyer does 
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not know the details of the auction and hence auctions are said 
to be a game of incomplete information. Hayek explained that 
the auction environment illustrates the problem of utilizing 
knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality [12]. An 
established fact is that the uncertainty of the value of the items 
under transaction is the beauty of the auction which allows 
competitive bidding. The areas of transactions where auctions 
allow theory and its implications to be employed are: houses, 
cars, agricultural products, art and antiques. Further, the 
transaction range is becoming wider with the advent of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT), for 
example, in general e-commerce and more specifically is eBay 
and trademe online auctions. There are four main types of 
auctions in practice; English, Dutch, first-price sealed-bid and 
second-price sealed-bid [9]. These auctions are practiced 
elsewhere for the transaction purpose of goods and services. 
English auction methods have been used in trading the arts and 
antiques, the Dutch auction is being used in the trading of cut 
flowers in the Netherlands, fish in Israel and tobacco in 
Canada. First-price sealed-bid auctions are primarily used by 
governments in tenders for procurement. On the other hand, 
second-price sealed-bid auctions have significant theoretical 
importance; however, they are seldom used in practice. 
Though the practices of auction principles have been used 
since the Babylonian era (193 A.D.), attention became 
widespread from 1996 once William Vickery was awarded the 
Nobel Prize in Economics for his contribution to auction theory 
[1]. The paper by Vickery entitled “Counterspeculation, 
Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders” [8] is the widely 
recommended paper to read by auction theorists [1], [4]. The 
paper developed some special cases of Revenue Equivalence 
Theorem (RET). The second price sealed-bid auction is 
sometimes called the Vickery auction after his name. The 
English auction is widely used, and the New Zealand wool 
auction is an example of public out-cry English auction. 
II. LITERATURE FOCUSING ON VARIOUS AUCTIONS 
A. English Auction 
English auctions are the ascending type auction where the 
auctioneer starts from a minimum price. In an English auction, 
the auctioneer begins by asking for bids at a low price and then 
gradually raises the price until only one willing buyer remains.  
The price increases along with the bidders bidding. Once, only 
one bidder is there to bid for a certain type of sale item he or she 
becomes the owner of that item. All the bidders who want to bid 
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in an English auction environment have their own value for the 
item. This independent-private-value (IPV) is not known to 
other bidders. On the other hand, they would be in a common 
value (CV) environment if the bidders have common 
information of the item to be auctioned. Further, CV is possible 
without having common information once the bidders enter the 
real auction environment and know the value of other bidders. 
In the real- world auction environment, CV is known to all 
Participating bidders. Still their respective 
independent-private-value towards the item is unknown. We 
can assume that IPV and CV follow some probability 
distribution. The real-world auction situations are likely to 
contain aspects of both models simultaneously. The IPV and 
CV are identically and independently drawn values from a 
common probability distribution. The IPV and CV of one 
bidder are statistically independent to other bidders. 
Among the various literature on auction theory, [1]-[16] are 
relevant to this study. The references [1]-[7], covered many 
aspects of auction. For example, [1] is a collection of journal 
articles written from 1999 to 2003 and published in various 
journals. This collection of articles is an extraordinary 
presentation of auction theory in a non-technical manner. In 
other words, this book is a thorough review of auction theory. 
On the other hand, [2] focuses on how to put auction theory to 
work. Milgrom presented the mathematical overview, in 
particular the tools of ordinary demand theory that includes the 
envelope theorem and the comparative static techniques [2]. A 
detailed overview of single object and multiple object auction 
models is provided in [3]. The discussed models were 
illustrated by proven propositions. Reference [4] is primarily 
focused on the beginner reader in auction theory. This book 
presented auction mechanism design along with the values of 
auction which are independent private value, common value 
and affiliated value. A detailed explanation of common value is 
covered in [5]. The success story of a booming online local 
New Zealand auction, trademe, is depicted in [6]. With a 
different perspective, [7] is primarily focused on how auctions 
play a role in forming the social construction of value.  
The journal articles [8]-[12] and [14]-[16] bring the auction 
theory into the picture with various illustrations of assumptions 
and their relaxations. As recommended by many auction 
theorists, [8] and [9] are still essential reading [1], [4]. 
Reference [8] analyses the special cases of RET while [9] 
surveys the developments in the theory of bidding mechanisms 
and discusses the relevance of the theoretical results for 
auctions in practice. Mathematical models covering all four 
types of auctions are presented in [10]. A focus on asymmetric 
English auctions is presented in [11]. This study introduced two 
different conditions (average crossing and cyclic crossing) and 
contrasted them in an English auction environment. On the 
other hand, [12] described an auction as an incomplete and 
imperfect information scenario which is not given to anyone in 
its totality. The possibility of re-auctioning is presented by a 
model in [14]. 
As reviewed above, there are many theoretical studies 
carried out focusing on an English auction environment. The 
following studies primarily highlighted the different aspects of 
an English auction environment from the applications 
perspective. For example, reference [15] focused on the 
inference with an incomplete model of English auctions.  This 
study explored an incomplete model based on two assumptions: 
bidders neither bid more than their valuations nor let an 
opponent win at a price they would be willing to beat. The 
proposed approach was applied to the evaluation of U.S. Forest 
Service timber auctions which successfully addressed a policy 
debate regarding reserve prices in timber auctions.  
A final price prediction model in the auction environment 
has recently been studied taking into account the stochastic 
process [16]. This study proposed stochastic models and tested 
them with the auction data from eBay. In particular, simulation 
based model and Markov process model were developed and 
compared for the prediction of final price. 
B. Other Auctions 
As described previously, the theoretical literature [1]-[5] 
cover the aspects of other auction environments too. We are 
interested in the English auction and in particular New Zealand 
wool auction, hence, we are not presenting other auction 
environments and their applications. 
III. NEW ZEALAND WOOL AUCTION: AN ENGLISH 
PUBLIC OUT-CRY AUCTION 
The New Zealand Wool Industry (NZWI) is contributing 
over a billion New Zealand dollars per year to the New Zealand 
economy. Being a major contributor to the economy, there is a 
high significance of the study of wool trading systems like 
auctions in New Zealand. The New Zealand wool auction is a 
public out-cry auction which has been running for the last 150 
years. The New Zealand wool auction is a selling avenue of 
New Zealand Wool Clip (NZWC). A total of 60% of NZWC is 
traded via auction. The auction runs in the English auction 
principle. The procedure of auction operation and participation 
of the bidder is similar to the online English auction. However, 
the difference is that the bidders’ are physically present there to 
make a bid for particular New Zealand wool clip of interest to 
their business. The NZWC is produced through the combined 
efforts of some 20,000 individual farmers. During any one 
twelve month period, each farmer produces a variety of wool 
types which come forward at times that are dictated by weather 
and necessary farming practices. There are over 3000 types of 
wool produced in New Zealand. This reflects also the different 
breeds, age, and place of origin on the sheep’s body. Wool is 
further separated and differentiated by various types of possible 
contamination from vegetable matter to cotts. It is also produced 
at different locations throughout the country. The diversity 
inherited in the NZWC resembles a complex system. Being 
diverse and complex in nature, the bidders’ in the wool auction 
follow the traditional ways of bidding instead of any automated 
system. The live scenario of the New Zealand wool auction 
shows that though the bidding procedure is traditional, the 
bidders are getting real time feedback via their offices on some 
major factors like currency fluctuations during the hours. An 
example of the Christchurch wool auction centre, the only 
centre in the South island of New Zealand, shows that around 
forty bidders are registered for the bidding purpose. However, 




all of the registered bidders are not actively involved in buying 
the wool via auction. This shows that the number of bidders 
during the auction hours is uncertain and hence it follows the 
independent –private- value (IPV) model and common value 
(CV) model like in other English auction environments. 
However, in practice, the major market is controlled by quite a 
few exporters. Taking the whole New Zealand wool export 
market into perspective, the statistics show that New Zealand 
exports 20% of the world wool market [13]. The top ten export 
destinations of NZWC are shown in Table I. 
IV. MATHEMATICAL ASSUMPTIONS IN AN ENGLISH 
AUCTION: BIDDER’S PERSPECTIVE FROM NEW ZEALAND WOOL 
AUCTION 
In any auction environment, we consider that Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem (RET) has a significant role. RET in 
general gives the message that the seller can expect equal 
profits on average from all the standard as well as non-standard 
types of auctions [1]. As RET is a fundamental basis for auction 
theory, we can assume that if the bidders are risk neutral the 
seller would not benefit from such risk neutral bidders. 
However, on the other hand, if the bidders are risk averse the 
seller would expect more benefit from such bidders. The risk 
averse bidders are more volatile than the risk neutral bidders. 
Further, as discussed in section II, every bidder may have to 
follow two models simultaneously during the time of bidding.  
In this paper, we try to follow as closely as possible the 
standard notation of auction theory papers. Among the various 
assumptions, we would like to present two assumptions which 
are relevant to the New Zealand wool auction. The first one is 
whether RET holds true in the case of the uncertain number of 
bidders in an English auction environment. And, secondly, 
what the expected price of the bidder in any English auction 
environment is.   
The suitability of RET in the case of uncertain numbers of 
bidders which is relevant to the New Zealand wool auction is 
presented. 
We follow the proof based on [3],  
 
Let {1, 2,....., }N= denote the set of potential bidders and 
let A ⊆  be the set of actual bidders. Let us consider that an 
actual bidder i A∈  and let np  denote the probability that any 
participating bidder assigns to the event that he is facing n  
other bidders. Thus, bidder i  assigns probability np that the 
number of actual bidder is 1n + . The probabilities np do not 
depend on the identity of the bidder or on his value. It is also 
important that the set of actual bidders does not depend on the 
realized values. As long as bidders hold the same beliefs about 
the likelihood of meeting different numbers of rivals in an 
auction environment, the proposition holds that the expected 
payment of a bidder with value zero is zero, and yields the same 
expected revenue to the seller provided the values drawn are 
independently and identically distributed. 
 Let us consider a standard auction a  and a symmetric and 
increasing equilibrium β  of the auction. It should be noted 
here that the bidders are unsure about the number of rivals they 
have to face, β  does not depend on n . Let us assume that the 
expected payoff of a bidder with value x  who bids 
( )zβ -strategic bid- instead of the equilibrium bid ( )xβ . The 
probability that he faces n  other bidders is np . In this case, the 
bidder wins if ( )1
nY , the highest of n  values drawn from F , is 
less than z and the probability of this event is 
( ) ( ) ( )n nG z F z= . The overall probability that he will win 
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His expected payoff from bidding ( )zβ  when his value is x  
is then 
( , ) ( ) ( )
a a
z x G z x m z= −∏            (2) 
 
This shows that in the situation of uncertain number of bidders 
RET also holds true.  
Now, we would like to present the expected price of the 
bidder in an English auction environment. Let us take a case of 
three bidders having actual private types, 
1 2 3, , ,x a x b x c= = =  respectively with a b c< < , after [4], 
The implicit assumption is that the price starts at zero and rises 
continuously. The first player to drop out is player 1 at price 1p  
such that:  
1 1 2 3 1[ ]E V x a X X p= = = =           (3) 
Prior to bidder 1 dropping out, the expected values of bidders 2 
and 3 were given, respectively, by: 
 
2 1 32[ ]E V x b X X= = =             (4) 
and  
3 1 23[ ].E V x c X X= = =             (5) 
After bidder 1 drops out, these expected values are revised in 
the following way: 
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2 2 32 1 12[ , [ ] ]E V x b E V X X pX a= = = ==     (6) 
and 
3 2 33 1 13[ , [ ] ]E V x c E V X X pX a= = = ==       (7) 
The price keeps rising until the final price 2p  and the winner is 
determined as follows: 
2 3 1 22[ ],E V x b X pp= = =            (8) 
The value of the object to player 3 prior to knowing 2p is 
3 2 13[ ].,E V x c X p= =              (9) 
Bidder 3 wins the auction at price 2p .  
If we generalize for n  players, the expected price in an English 
auction environment is, 
 
1 1 1 2 3 1 1[ [ , ,..., ] ]
E
nP E E V X y Y Y Y X x Y= = = = >       (10) 
 
Now, we will present a model. The model presented in Fig. 1 
is flexible enough to accommodate the decision making 
behaviors of a bidder in any New Zealand wool auction. Two 
stages of the model can be categorized: prior to auction and 
during and after auction 
As explained in [10], the English auction has many variants. 
The New Zealand wool auction can also be considered as the 
Japanese version of the English auction. It is idealized as 
follows: prior to auction day, the bidders are given the 
opportunity to inspect the sample of wool types going to be 
auctioned. Further, the bidders are provided catalogues of wool 
types going to be auctioned in the auction center for the day. In 
the catalogues, the information like wool quality factors 
(Diameter, color, vegetable matter, length of the wool staple) is 
provided. The prior observation would help to do the 
requirement analysis for the bidder. Prior to auction, the 
bidders take into account many factors. Likewise, during and 
after auction the bidders take into consideration the factors. 
Among the factors, three major factors play a role in both 
situations which are ‘physical parameters of wool’, ‘wool 
quality category’ and ‘number of bales in stock and types’. 
These factors are common to the bidders in competition. The 
model generated from these factors is common to all the 
bidders. In auction theory terms, the distribution generated by 
such common factors is common value (CV) model. From the 
figure, it can be seen that the bidder with the requirement 
analysis in their mind competes in the auction. This leads us to 
assume that like other English auction types, the bidders have 
CVs for the wool types they are going to buy. With their CV, 
they compete in the auction environment and the bidder 
chooses whether to be active at the start price 0p .  
In addition to this, particularly for the wool auction, five 
specific factors, which are independent to the bidders, 
determine the price of the wool in an auction. The five factors 
are different to all the bidders and not known to each other. In 
other words, we can say that the price of the wool in an auction 
is a function of these five factors: 
Price of the wool in any auction = f (Stock held, forward sales 
position, available wool types in specific auction, currency 
factor, seasonality of supply).  
 
These five factors are the major constituents that contribute to 
make the independent-private-value (IPV) model different to 
each bidder. With the IPV and CV in their minds, bidders 
participate in the auction environment. IPV and CV are 
simultaneously used by the respective participating bidders. As 
the auctioneer raises the price, bidders drop out one by one. 
However, any bidder can come back in up to the final knock of 
the hammer, finalizing the sale. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Auction theory with a highlight of an English auction 
environment is presented. A model showing the decision 
making behavior of bidders from the New Zealand wool 
auction shows that the price of wool type in an auction is the 
function of independent private values and common values of 
the bidders. This study will help us to make an extension of the 
functioning model that will help the bidders to make efficient 
decisions in the wool auction environment. Such 
semi-automatic tools will contribute to high returns in wool 
trading.  
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Fig. 1  A model showing the decision making behaviors of a bidder in the New Zealand wool auction environment. 
During and after auction
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